Action on autonomous weapons at the Summit for the Future
Which states are supporting? Who’s spoiling?
Autonomy in weapon systems is back on the agenda following a Vienna meeting attended by 144 states to discuss how to move forward with regulation - summarised here by the conference’s Austrian chair. Eyes now turn to a meeting of world leaders in September at the UN: the Summit of the Future which is quietly becoming a major opportunity to boost the project for regulation.
The brainchild of UN Secretary-General Guterres, the summit is billed as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity [to] demonstrate that international cooperation can effectively tackle current challenges as well as those that have emerged in recent years or may yet be over the horizon”. In short, the summit is meant to map out solutions to global problems and commit to the global governance upgrades required to deliver them.
Intergovernmental negotiations on the summit’s outcome document, the “Pact for the Future”, began in January 2024 and will continue throughout the summer. The Pact will be agreed by consensus and endorsed by world leaders.
Drafts of the Pact cover everything from climate to conflict to development to future generations. Threats relating to emerging technology feature heavily and include a paragraph on autonomous weapons under the “International peace and security” chapter. Positive opportunities relating to AI fall under a chapter on “Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation”. It is expected that the Pact will also include as an annex a separately negotiated “Global Digital Compact” which will agree on a set of shared principles for an “open, free and secure digital future for all”.
Previous major summits have been designed with clear outcomes in mind - such as the 2015 summit to create the SDGs or the 2005 world summit which established the Human Rights Council. In contrast, the Summit of the Future is sprawling in scope and badly in need of a headline take-away to avoid the distinct possibility of the whole affair being seen as a flop. A bold, tangible commitment to take action on autonomous weapons could just provide the solution.
Introducing the draft Pact’s commitment for a new treaty on autonomous weapons
Pact co-facilitators Germany and Namibia included strong language on autonomous weapons systems in their 26 January Zero Draft based on consultations with states, the UN and civil society:
“88. Building on progress made in multilateral negotiations, we commit to concluding without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight, and which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems.”
Those that follow the issue will note that the call for a new treaty on autonomous weapons is supported by almost 120 states and this commitment in the Zero Draft broadly reflects the “two-tier” structure of prohibition and regulation to address autonomous weapons systems that many states have expressed support for whether they agree with negotiating a new treaty or not. It also broadly reflects the treaty structure being proposed by the UN Secretary General, the ICRC and the Stop Killer Robots campaign (though these actors’ calls go further, in proposing a wider set of prohibitions and regulations).
The Zero Draft was intended to be an ambitious starting point and this was certainly the case for autonomous weapons systems. Given that the final document must be agreed by consensus, and not all states support a new legally binding treaty on the issue, pushback will have been anticipated.
It is possible that negotiations will continue right up to the September summit although they are expected to conclude in July or August.
Who supports the Pact’s call for a new treaty? Who's pushing back?
Spoiler Alert has seen working drafts following the first and second readings of the draft Pact which contain detailed descriptions of the language edits that individual states and groups of states are pushing for.
Before summarising the language wranglings it should be noted that drafts of the Pact are very long and cover a dizzying range of issues - understandably most states have not given feedback on every proposed commitment. The absence of participation on the language could be due to numerous reasons: it may indicate that states are content with what’s proposed; they may plan to suggest amendments later; they may be skeptical of the Pact and are not following it closely; they may be stretched on capacity; or they may convey their views via other routes.
Fourteen states are actively trying to remove the explicit commitment to create a legally binding instrument from the Pact text: Brazil, the Gulf Cooperation Council (comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Türkiye, UK and the US.
Seven states are pushing language to explicitly support keeping discussions in the Geneva-based Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) - a consensus-bound treaty making forum which is widely seen as a dead end for the prospect of achieving a new instrument: Australia, Brazil, India, Russia, Türkiye, UK and the US.
Thirty-two states plus two non-member entities are active in the language discussions on this paragraph and are either not pushing back on the commitment for a legally binding treaty or are actively trying to strengthen it: China, the EU (27 European countries), Holy See, ICRC, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico and Uruguay.
It is notable that the numbers of states involved in trying to spoil the bid for a strong commitment on autonomous weapons are relatively small although they do include three Permanent members of the Security Council: Russia, UK and the US. It was surprising to see Brazil and Switzerland in this camp - both of whom are widely seen as leaders in the push for action on this issue and whose statements in Vienna (see here and here) appeared to support the idea of a legally binding instrument. Switzerland’s role in Pact negotiations clearly seeks to remove wording committing to a “legally binding instrument” (see Annex) whereas Brazil is aligning with a US wording suggestion aimed at keeping discussions within the consensus-bound CCW while leaving the door open for a non-legally-binding product (see Annex). Clarifications from these two states would be useful.
Perhaps most notably though: the EU is not objecting to the idea of a new legally binding instrument or pushing for negotiations to be restricted to the CCW. This suggests EU-member Austria - which perhaps more than any other state has led the call for a new treaty - has together with a handful of other treaty supporters managed to convince their EU colleagues not to obstruct this effort. This means France, a permanent member of the Security Council that has not yet supported a legally binding instrument, and diplomatic heavyweight Germany, who has supported an instrument but consistently insisted that it should be negotiated through the CCW, appear willing to put their opposition to one side for now.
One other observation is the endorsement by Mexico and South Africa of the ICRC’s attempt to introduce a moral threshold to the text: “that the autonomous targeting of humans by machines is a moral line that we must not cross” [emphasis added]. Prohibiting autonomous weapons systems that target people is already a key pillar of the ICRC’s (and Stop Killer Robots) position and many believe it could become a strong norm for the international community to mobilise around in the future. Japan and the US objected to the ICRC suggestion.
A detailed readout of the language interactions is annexed below this article.
The First Revision
Following the two rounds of discussions which produced the positions described above, the co-facilitators circulated a new draft. The “First Revision”, released on 14 May 2024, has a new structure based on 52 actions, 10 of which are in the “International peace and security” chapter, including:
“Action 23. We will address the risks posed by emerging domains and technologies.”
Under this action there are a series of sub-actions including:
“(b) Conclude by 2026 a legally binding instrument to prohibit autonomous weapons systems that select targets and apply force without human control, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems to ensure their compliance with international humanitarian law.”
Given the evident divisions, many were expecting the co-facilitators to water down the commitment to act on autonomous weapons. However, the co-facilitators’ First Revision not only maintains the commitment for a “legally binding instrument”, but makes it significantly stronger by adding a deadline to conclude the instrument “by 2026”.
One possibility is that the co-facilitators are considering the views of the 119 states on record supporting a new treaty on autonomous weapons, most of them small and medium sized countries that are not active in the minutiae of Pact negotiations. Another possibility is that the commitment for a new treaty is widely regarded as one of the few tangible solutions present in the Pact’s sprawling drafts and so the co-facilitators and those championing a meaningful Pact are keen to sustain it if at all possible.
It is striking how similar the First Revision’s strengthened commitment is to the call made by the UN Secretary-General in his “New Agenda for Peace”:
“conclude, by 2026, a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapon systems that function without human control or oversight, and which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems.”
Is Guterres dialing up his own advocacy efforts and to try to push this through and secure a lasting legacy on peace and security?
Next steps
How to address autonomy in weapons systems is a hotly contested international discussion. All five Permanent Members of the Security Council - China, Russia, the UK, the US and France (through the EU position) - are active on this part of the Pact, as are a diverse range of countries. While most small and medium-sized states are yet to wade in, the third round of negotiations is now getting underway, expected to conclude in early July, so there is still time.
It would be momentous if a strong commitment on autonomous weapons makes it into the final document. Such a result may not be likely, but it is not impossible if UN delegations were reminded of the difference between consensus and unanimity - the former being something that must be forged, not found. As with most consensus-bound documents, it should not be necessary for each state to support each commitment in the Pact. Instead, in the interests of not obstructing progress supported by a strong majority, states should be willing to endorse the Pact with reservations.
If the commitment did make the cut, it would set the scene for action in the UN General Assembly’s first committee this October/November. As it stands, the Secretary-General has been asked to publish a report of states’ views on how to address the risks posed by autonomy in weapons systems. With a large group of states mobilised on the issue, a resolution could be adopted around this time to schedule diplomatic negotiations on a legally binding instrument in 2025.
ANNEX: Detailed readout of Pact language on autonomous weapons
The following section is a detailed description of which states/groups/entities have been active on Pact negotiations on autonomous weapons and their interactions on language. The list of contributions is not exhaustive; minor/grammatical suggestions have been omitted for readability.
First tier bullet points are initial state comments circulated by the co-facilitators on 19 February based on paragraph 88 of the Zero Draft:
“88. Building on progress made in multilateral negotiations, we commit to concluding without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight, and which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems.”
Second tier bullet points are comments following the second reading - mostly responses to the previous set of suggestions - circulated by the co-facilitators on 3 April.
While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity or completeness of the comments listed below, Spoiler Alert cannot guarantee their accuracy. Please get in touch on info@lexinternational.org to report any errors.
Australia
Has suggested an entirely new paragraph: “We commit to fulfilling the mandate of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, established under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and reaffirm that the CCW remains the primary forum for addressing developments in weapons technologies.”
After second reading: Türkiye and the UK align with Australia’s suggestion while Egypt opposes it
China
Wants to replace “and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems” with “and to establish an effective governance regime, ensure that military application of AI shall never be used as a tool to launch a war or pursue hegemony, and will not damage global strategic balance and stability.”
After second reading: US and Switzerland oppose this suggestion by China
European Union
Wants to highlight the CCW though its suggestion that the Zero Draft be changed from “Building on progress made in multilateral negotiations” to: “Building on progress made within the group of governmental experts on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS established within the Convention on conventional weapons”
After second reading: Türkiye, Japan and Brazil align with the EU’s suggestion while Egypt opposes it
Wants to delete the words “or oversight” from “lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight” in the Zero Draft
After second reading: Mexico opposes EU’s suggestion and wants to retain “or oversight”
Wants to add the word “full” to “compliance with international humanitarian law” so it reads “which cannot be used in full compliance with international humanitarian law”
After second reading: Uruguay aligns with this EU suggestion
Wants to add the word “lethal” so the second mention of “autonomous weapons systems” reads “lethal autonomous weapons systems” (the same formulation as the first mention in the draft)
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Dislikes the idea of a new treaty and suggests changing the Zero Draft from “concluding without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit” to: “concluding without delay norms, rules and principles to regulate”
After second reading: the US opposes the GCC’s suggestion
Holy See
Wants to make non-compliance with international law a corollary of a weapon system’s inability to function without human control or oversight by adding the word “therefore” in the phrase “that function without human control or oversight, and which therefore cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law”
India
Wants language which supports keeping negotiations in the CCW through their suggested replacement paragraph “We commit to building on progress of discussions relating to lethal autonomous weapons systems under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) through continued multilateral negotiations in the Group of Governmental Experts of the CCW on Emerging Technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”
After second reading: Türkiye aligns with India’s suggestion while Egypt and the US oppose it
Indonesia
Wants to insert wording about inclusivity in the treaty-making process and suggests changing “concluding without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit” to “an inclusive process to conclude without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit”
After second reading: US and Japan oppose Indonesia’s suggestion
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Wants to add “and given that the autonomous targeting of humans by machines is a moral line that we must not cross” after the opening phrase so it would read “Building on progress m
ade in multilateral negotiations, and given that the autonomous targeting of humans by machines is a moral line that we must not cross”
After second reading: Mexico and South Africa align themselves with the ICRC’s suggestion while the US and Japan want to delete it.
Wants to delete the word “lethal” from the mention of “lethal autonomous weapons systems” in the Zero Draft
After second reading: the US opposes the ICRC’s suggestion and wants to retain the word “lethal”
Israel
Wants to highlight the CCW though its suggestion that the Zero Draft be changed from “Building on progress made in multilateral negotiations” to: “Building on progress made in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”
After second reading: Japan aligns with Israel’s suggestion while Egypt opposes it
Wants to replace “and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems” with “further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument addressing emerging technology in the area of LAWS”
After second reading: Mexico wants to delete “by consensus” in Israel’s suggestion
Japan
Has suggested an entirely new paragraph: “Building on progress made in multilateral discussions, we commit not to use lethal autonomous weapons systems cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law [sic], and commit to control autonomous weapons systems to uphold compliance with international law, in particular international humanitarian law, including the principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack”
After second reading: UK aligns with Japan’s suggestion
Mexico
Wants a deadline added to when a treaty should be achieved by and suggests changing the Zero Draft language from “we commit to concluding without delay a legally binding instrument” be replaced by “we will commence negotiations, no later than 2025, of a legally binding instrument”
After second reading: US, Switzerland, Türkiye and Japan oppose Mexico’s suggestion
Wants to broaden the phrase “which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law” to “which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law”
After second reading: EU aligns with Mexico’s suggestion
Wants to append “and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems” with “ensuring they meet ethical and international legal standards”
Second reading
After second reading: Mexico appears to attempt a compromise solution to recognise the CCW by suggesting adding “in particular through the CCW” so the opening phrase would read: “Building on progress made in multilateral negotiations in particular through the CCW”. Egypt opposes Mexico’s suggestion.
Republic of Korea
Wants language which is less specific about the idea of a new treaty and suggests changing the Zero Draft from “concluding without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit” to: “continue the international efforts to prohibit”
Wants to delete the phrase “that function without human control or oversight” from “lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight” in the Zero Draft
After second reading: EU opposes RoK’s suggestion and wants to retain this phrase
Russia
Has suggested the paragraph is replaced by three entirely new paragraphs: “We confirm that the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems is an optimal platform for discussing military aspects of the use of AI and is designed to maintain reasonable balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate defense interests of States. We emphasize the need for further work in this format on the basis of the discussion mandate agreed up to 2026 and emphasize the counterproductivity of transferring the discussion of the problems related to military use of AI from the GGE to any other international platforms.
We state the applicability of the norms and principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) to all weapons systems, including autonomous ones, and the sufficiency of existing international legal regulation. We proceed from the lack, at present, of convincing grounds for the adoption of any new restrictions and prohibitions regarding autonomous weapons systems, modernization or adaptation of IHL to them.
We point out the expediency of developing a unified definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems and a common understanding of their essence. We express commitment to the need to maintain human control over any technology in order to ensure compliance with the norms and principles of international law.”After second reading: Switzerland, UK, US and EU opposes Russia’s suggestion. Mexico reserves on Russia’s first paragraph and wants to delete Russia’s second paragraph.
Switzerland
Dislikes the mention of a new treaty and suggests changing the Zero Draft from “concluding without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit” to: “developing options to prevent the emergence of”
Türkiye
Has suggested an entirely new paragraph: “Building on progress made in multilateral negotiations, and in the context of the objectives and purpose of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), we agree to consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems.”
After second reading: UK aligns with Türkiye’s suggestion
United Kingdom
Wants to replace “and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems” with “ensuring that all lethal autonomous weapons systems are used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and that those that function without context appropriate human involvement or oversight in all circumstances of their use are not developed or deployed”
United States
Has suggested an entirely new paragraph: “Building on progress made at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) established under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, we stress the urgent need for the international community to address the challenges and concerns raised by autonomous weapons systems, in particular through the GGE on LAWS and encourage participants in the GGE to strive to fulfil its mandate to formulate, by consensus, a set of elements for an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures to address LAWS, taking into consideration the two-tier approach to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems”
After second reading: Türkiye and Brazil aligns with the US suggestion while Egypt opposes it